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1. Introduction 
During the last few years, the Arab Spring resulted in peaceful uprisings, militant clashes, and 
theoretical debates in many countries with various social and political contexts. In a globalized 
world, and due to de facto spreading out, one of the intensively debated issues has revolved 
around the flux of Arab refugees to Europe. Dominantly Muslims, those immigrants raise many 
controversial questions related to their hosting European societies, including the extent to 
which the old continent will continue to look “Christian” or even “European” after few decades. 
Muslim communities in European countries have been involved in these crucial debates. On 
one hand, they are European citizens, with all relevant rights and duties. But on the other hand, 
they belong to the Muslim Ummah (worldwide nation), which mandates Islamic solidarity and 
religiously-prescribed close relationships with all Muslims. Practically, the reactions of Muslim 
communities in Europe to this mandate vary from country to country. 
Practically, these legal relationships between state and various communities play a crucial role 
in shaping the scope of action for religious communities within the arena of civil society. In this 
paper, I will focus mainly on the socially-constructed relationships between Muslim 
communities in Europe and her states to explore their scope of action as far as the issue of 
Muslim refugees in Europe is concerned. 
I will build on Michael Barnett and Janice Grass Stein’s argument that secularization and 
sanctification are multi-layered, multidimensional, and nonlinear. Basically, they contend that 
historically-constructed processes first establish sacred and secular concepts and spaces, 
then, different actors can serve their agendas by employing strategies to set, stabilize and 
modify those concepts and spaces (Barnett and Stein: 11). Applying this argument, I select 
Turkey and Great Britain as case studies to compare the similarities and differences between 
Muslim communal organisations in a Muslim-majority state seeking EU membership, and their 
counterparts in a Muslim-minority state seeking to depart from the EU. I argue that although 
Muslims are religiously committed to showing solidarity with each other, the dynamics of 
Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence) allow them to construct various interpretations and 
implementations of this solidarity, given the social and political contexts. The reaction to the 
refugees’ issue in Europe is not an exception; rather, Muslim communities always vary in their 
socially constructed understandings of Islamic sacred rules and strategies of political actions. 
The first section reviews the main concepts of Islamic Solidarity, citizens, and refugees. Then, 
the second section analyses socioeconomic and political bases of the relations between 
Muslim communal organisations in Turkey and the UK states, and the impact on how Muslim 
citizens treat Muslim refugees. The third section investigates the strategies and outcomes of 
main Islamic humanitarian institutions in these countries concerning the issue of refugees. 
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Humanitarian organisations or social movements, other than Islamic ones, are not applicable 
cases for examining Islamic solidarity. I study principally the Humanitarian Relief Foundation 
(IHH) in Turkey, known initially as the Foundation of Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief, and the Islamic Relief in the UK. The conclusion reflects on their potential 
influences in future developments of this issue in European countries. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Understanding the critical relationships between local citizens and foreign refugees in the light 
of Islamic solidary requires conceptual clarifications of three main concepts: Islamic solidarity, 
refugees, and citizens. This section discusses these concepts and examines their 
interrelationship. 
2.1 Islamic Solidarity 
2.1.1 Meaning 
The concept of Islamic solidarity is defined as a set of actions taken to supporting, caring for, 
or defending Muslim males and females (brothers and sisters). Mutual religious faith is the 
influential requirement for showing this solidarity. The Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon 
him) once said: 
"The believers in their mutual kindness, compassion and sympathy are just like one body. 
When one of the limbs suffers, the whole body responds to it with wakefulness and fever". [Al-
Bukhari and Muslim: Book 1, Hadith 224]1. 
The Prophet also said, stressing the unconditionality of showing solidarity: 
"Help your brother, whether he is an oppressor, or he is an oppressed one. People asked, "O 
Allah's Messenger! It is all right to help him if he is oppressed, but how should we help him if 
he is an oppressor?" The Prophet said, "By preventing him from oppressing others." (Sahih al-
Bukhari 2444; Book 46, Hadith 5)2. 
These statements clarify the obligation of Islamic solidarity. Muslims must show support to their 
male and female counterparts, as the believers are like the whole body. The obligation comes 
from sharing religious faiths, regardless of the believers’ stands. In addition, the second 
statement explains differences of solidarity with the oppressed and the oppressors: It means 
defending the oppressed and backing them to get rid of oppression and enjoy their rights, while 
preventing the oppressors from their oppression, thus saving them from punishment in the 
Hereafter. Interestingly, Islamic solidarity goes beyond physical caring to satisfying spiritual 
needs. For example, Mayke Kaag acknowledged the role of Islamic humanitarian relief in Chad 
                                                             
1 https://sunnah.com/riyadussaliheen/1/224 
2 https://sunnah.com/bukhari/46 
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as not only fulfilling the materialistic needs but also creating a new concept of community of 
the faithful (Kaag: 464). 
The position of non-Muslims in this paradigm might be controversial. Islamic jurisprudence 
allows a wide space for various understandings and implementations in this regard. One group 
of theologians and scholars argue that non-Muslims are potential Muslims, so they are qualified 
to receive Zakat (religiously obligatory charity) as the main source of financial support. They 
understand the concept of the poor as those who deserve Zakat, whether Muslim or non-
Muslim3. Based on a humanitarian perspective, they encourage the support of needy non-
Muslims, unconnected from calling them to Islam4. Consequently, while the UK-based Islamic 
Relief provides aid for non-Muslims without calling them to Islam (Mayke Kaag: 465), Another 
prestigious, UK-based organisation, Muslim Aid, restricts its aid to Muslims (Benthall and 
Bellion-Jourdan: 10). In short, although Islamic solidarity is an obligation among Muslims due 
to their shared religion, its implementation varies per case. 
2.1.2 Levels and Political Limitations 
Islamic solidarity is not limited in the Qur’an nor in the Sunnah (the Prophet’s sayings and 
deeds) to specific actions. As in various issues in Islamic jurisprudence, the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah give only general instructions and leave the practicalities to be determined in 
accordance with the changing realities and conditions and personal and societal capabilities 
and evaluations. 
In Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in The Muslim World, Jonathan Benthall, and Jerome 
Bellion-Jourdan classify Islamic solidarity, based on the Afghani experience, into three 
correlated levels; Jihad (fighting), Da’wa (call for Islam, which the authors translate 
inaccurately as militancy) and Ighatha (humanitarian relief). During the 1980s, the Afghani war 
against Soviet occupation resulted in a huge campaign for showing Islamic solidarity on these 
three correlated levels (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 69-74). Unlike Benthall and Bellion-
Jourdan, I argue that this campaign, though partially official, received a significant support from 
Muslim masses due to feelings of religious obligation. Because of the Cold War, it also enjoyed 
obvious regional and international encouragement. 
                                                             
3 In accordance with Islamic rules, Muslims must pay Zakat (religiously obligatory charity) to any of the seven 
categories specified in The Qur’an. One of them concerns the newly converted Muslims. Another one, “for the Sake 
of Allah”, is so general as to include them as well. Also, Muslims are advised to pay additional voluntary charities, 
with unlimited amounts, and for unspecified categories. Charity in general aims at showing solidarity with humanity, 
with priority usually given to Muslims, but unlimited to them. It spreads to non-Muslims and even animals. For more 
details, see: Khaled Mansour and Heba Raouf Ezzat, “Faith-Based Action in Development and Humanitarian Work” 
(In) Ashwani Kumar, Jan Art Scholte, Mary Kaldor, Marlies Glasius, Hakan Seckinelgin, Helmut Anheier (eds.) 
Global Civil Society, London: Sage, 2009, p.123. 
4 For details on this discussion, see: Jonathan Benthall, and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent: 
Politics of Aid in the Muslim World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2nd Edition, 2009) p.10 
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Muslims of several nationalities arrived in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union, while others 
practiced Da'wa (call for Islam) to explain correct Islamic rituals and concepts to their less 
knowledgeable brothers and sisters, especially non-Arabs. Humanitarian relief was a caring 
service for both civilians and Mujahedeen (fighters). Muslims freely changed their roles in these 
categories based on appropriateness, because each is accepted by the targeted publics and 
fulfils a religious obligation. 
For Islamic institutions and communities, this appropriateness is not merely based on 
individual wills. Practicing Islamic solidarity depends on calculations of Maslaha (benefit) and 
Mafsadah (harm) for the whole community, in the light of Maqassid al-Shari’ah (the ultimate 
goals of Islamic jurisprudence), which include the protection of faith, reason, life, honour and 
wealth. Furthermore, the absence of a hierarchical religious institution in Islamic traditions 
allows for a variety of interpretations and implementations of Islamic rules and obligations. 
Based on different calculations of benefits and harms, several readings were developed, and 
consequently various paths were taken, as the showing of Islamic solidarity has been a 
continuous practice throughout Islamic history, in physical, spiritual and financial terms, and 
on the individual and institutionalized levels. 
Shortly after the end of the Afghani war in the early 1990s, previously acknowledged sorts of 
Islamic solidarity were soon labelled terrorist. Both US administrations and local governments 
in Muslim countries, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, accused foreign supporters in the 
Afghani and Bosnian wars of being terrorists (Mansour and Ezzat: 123-129). However, most 
such accusations targeted militant and proselytizing activists, while humanitarian relief, which 
was considered a new promising form of Islamic solidarity, was set aside. Simultaneously, UK-
based Islamic Relief was received significant domestic and international support, as a leading 
Muslim humanitarian relief organisation in a Western context. 
Humanitarian relief turned to be the sole, internationally-recognized activity of Islamic 
solidarity. For instance, Carlo Benedetti explains the “100 percent Islamic solidarity chain” as 
Islamic philanthropic organisations that use religious rituals, like Zakat (obligatory charity) and 
Sadaqat (optional charity), to raise fund through Islamic financial institutions to achieve 
recommended Islamic actions in favour of Muslims (Benedetti: 855)5. Accordingly, Islamic 
Relief is not a “100 percent Islamic solidarity chain” because its activities do not distinguish 
between Muslims and Non-Muslims, and it does not require total Islamic commitment from its 
members or employees. Thus, Benedetti defines it as a moderate Islamic NGO, distinct from 
                                                             
5 For details on using Islamic finance in Islamic humanitarian relief, see: Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-
Jourdan (2009): The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World. London: I. B. Tauris, 2nd Edition, 
pp.29-44 
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strict organisations of Islamic chain which usually define their mission in terms of 
proselytization and are therefore described as militant Islamic NGOs (Benedetti: 856). 
Since the mid-1990s, some Arab governments and US administrations have increasingly used 
the “terrorist” label to condemn any militant struggle, regardless of its justification. For example, 
the Palestinian group Hamas, which used to be considered a resistance movement, is now 
labelled a terrorist group (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 77). Benedetti traces a similar pattern 
of religious solidarity behaviour in Christianity, as many Christian humanitarian relief 
organisations, with certain religious or ideological, commitments, were largely involved in 
militant and proselytizing activities, beside their humanitarian roles (Benedetti: 856). 
Surprisingly, these cases have rarely been labelled terrorist. 
Consequently, the concept of Islamic solidarity has been limited to humanitarian relief, while 
proselytization is condemned, and militant struggle criminalized. This was not appealing to 
many Muslims, who criticized Western governments severely during the Bosnian conflict for 
doing nothing except providing humanitarian relief. Also, Muslim humanitarian relief 
organisations faced similar criticisms from militant Islamic entities, as the humanitarian 
programs of the former were a weak form of commitment (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 82). 
However, religious legacies “are always selectively rebuilt to fulfil contemporary objectives” 
(Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 154). 
2.2 Refugees 
A refugee is defined as “the person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country” (Hein and Niazi: 728). 
From a legal perspective, there are technical differences, based on duties and rights, between 
Internally Displaced People (IDP), refugees and asylum-seekers. IDP live in their home 
country, having been relocated away from home; they have not fled beyond international 
borders. To the contrary, refugees have fled their land beyond borders to another country. The 
receiving country has an obligation to not return them home, in the fear of oppression. This is 
known as the principle of Non-Refoulment. They have a temporary status until they decide 
voluntarily to return home or seek asylum in the receiving country or elsewhere. Asylum-
seekers apply for citizenship and obtain legal rights until a decision is taken regarding their 
applications. During the processing of the application, which might continue for several years, 
asylum seekers cannot work but enjoy financial support, free medical care and legal counsel 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh: 298). 
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In the European context, the refugee has become an issue after World War II, with resulted in 
two million refugees, mostly European. Therefore, the Geneva Refugee Convention was 
adopted in 1951. A couple of decades later, the number of refugees from Africa and Asia 
increased significantly, due to the struggle against colonialism in their countries. Since the 
1990s, refugees have turned to be an Islamic phenomenon emerging from several countries, 
including Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Myanmar, and later and more significantly 
Syria (Hein and Niazi: 728). 
Suna Gulfer Ihlamur-Oner traces a new international system for refugees’ protection, 
acknowledging the receiving countries’ efforts, but also stressing the responsibility of the 
sending countries that forced the refugees to flee. This system significantly functioned in the 
Iraqi-Kurdish crisis and Yugoslavia’s crisis in the 1990s and allowed for a sort of humanitarian 
intervention in the sending countries (Ihlamur-Oner:199). Similar efforts, however, are still far 
away in Syria’s considerably more profound crisis. 
From a religious point of view, Prophet Muhammed’s migration from Mecca to Madinah in 
Western Arabia in 622 was a turning point in Islamic history. It marked the establishment of 
the first Islamic state and the beginning of the Islamic calendar. His followers who were forced 
to migrate from Mecca (the Muhajireen), and the others who received them in Madinah (the 
Ansar), are very appreciated by successive Muslim generations. Thus, the concept of fleeing 
from any sort of oppression is valued among Muslims and generates a considerable collective 
solidarity. For instance, granting asylum for refugees is recommended in Islam and an integral 
part of the Islamic concept of human rights. Some Muslim jurists go further to consider it an 
Islamic obligation (Kirmani and Khan: 2-3). 
Showing solidarity with refugees is an Islamic obligation regardless of the abovementioned, 
technical classifications and their subsequent legal rights. But observing the differences 
between these categories is important for Muslims to plan how they show solidarity with their 
brother and sisters. In short, Islamic solidarity is a religious obligation, while its modalities vary 
depending on benefits and harms. 
From a different religious perspective, Hein and Niazi study the receiving by India of Buddhist 
refugees, including the Dalai Lama, after their failed uprising against Chinese occupation in 
1959, as partially due to close ties between Buddhism and Hinduism (Hein and Niazi: 735). 
This means that religious ties, in Islam and other religions, could be one of the main incentives 
to welcoming refugees, alongside with other humanitarianism factors. 
2.3 Citizens 
The concept of citizenship has legal and social dimensions and little to do with religion. Legally, 
citizens, whether at home or abroad, have a certain set of duties and rights, regardless of their 
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methods of acquiring citizenship. Refugees are potential citizens if they enjoy the possibility of 
seeking asylum. Becoming a citizen should be a head start for achieving a degree of social 
integration with other citizens of in the country. However, this is not always the case because 
social integration concerns not only citizenship but more importantly the sharing of a culture, 
values, norms and perhaps a religion. Consequently, citizens assimilating the main values of 
a society might be fully integrated into it, while others feel alienated, although they continue to 
enjoy full legal rights. For example, the currently mushrooming trends of xenophobia and 
Islamophobia in Europe alienate foreigners, especially Muslims, regardless of their actual 
citizenships. 
Citizenship is not a religiously relevant concept. Religious solidarity is a borderless notion. 
Barnett and Stein describe the difference between the duty, which is provided everyday by 
parents, citizens, or government while crossing boarders turn it to humanitarianism. (Michael 
Barnett and Janice Grass Stein: 12-13). This case in Islam is not limited to borders, but to the 
brotherhood of faith. Interestingly, while humanitarian relief perspective provides, what is 
known as a comprehensive perspective to deal with refugees, regardless of their religion, its 
commitments to international boarders divide them into different categories with various legal 
rights. Contrarily, religious commitments for showing solidarity applies to all with shared faiths. 
This might explain successful fund-raising campaigns based on religious incentives regardless 
of their homeland. 
Thus, the dichotomy between religious obligations and legal rights and responsibilities of 
citizens impacts Muslim communities and organisations in Europe. Muslim NGOs carefully 
work to bridge any potential gap between their religious obligations, including the fulfilment of 
donors’ expectations in this regard, and their legal commitments as organisations of European 
citizens. They face the challenges of the growing trend of Islamophobia and the limitations of 
transnational networking as potential suspects of terrorism, although there is a considerable 
improvement in developing a dialogue with European publics. 
On Muslim refugees, a possible conflict emerges between the obligation of showing solidarity 
and the legal restrictions of citizenship. Consider the cases of Bosnian and Syrian refugees in 
European countries. Manal Omar argues that the Syrian crisis might be an opportunity for 
European countries to reshape their immigration policies, and European countries should 
recall their generosity in welcoming refugees from Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s in respect 
of the principle of Non-Refoulment (Omar: 33-34). However, Muslim NGOs, while expected to 
show solidarity with Syrian and Bosnian refugees, must abide by the laws of their countries 
which discriminates between European Bosnian and Middle Eastern Syrian refugees. 
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Thijl Sunier considers clarifying three concepts as a necessity for an understanding of the 
social integration of young people in Europe. One concept is the popular culture. He argues 
that practices of religion are public acts that can be assimilated into the common culture. The 
second concept is the public sphere in which Muslims’ public actions can arguably contribute 
to the change of. Finally, Sunier investigates European Muslim communities and NGOs’ 
identity politics. Given the attitude of Islamophobia widespread in Europe, these Muslims wish 
their actions to contribute to changing stereotypes and limitations in the public sphere. But they 
also consider new manifestations of Islamic solidarity adaptable to their European citizenship. 
New understandings and applications are granted in Islamic jurisprudence (Sunier: 129-132). 
After the 9/11 events, a new image was developed in that the culture of Muslim immigrants is 
a sort of discomfort and fear, which led to a gap between immigrants and the rest of the society 
(Ghorashi: 209), perhaps including their fellow European Muslims. Hallah Ghorashi argues 
that distinguishing between immigrants’ culture and Western culture is based on a static view 
of the concept of culture, which might be more dynamic. She stresses that Europe lacks a 
collective notion of citizenship that allows a space for interaction between differences among 
various backgrounds (Ghorashi: 212). Shaming the immigrants’ culture reflects Islamophobia 
more than any expression of actual defaults in the coming culture. 
David Thurfjell argues that the humiliation that Muslims feel might lead them to incline to adjust 
to the majority’s culture. Negative stereotypes leave Muslims with a paradox as they must 
choose between two extremes: whether to abandon Islam and silently hear the majority’s 
condemnation of it or to alien themselves from the majority’s culture and get integrated into a 
Muslim minority group which might be labelled radical or extremist (Thurfjell: 141-143). A 
vicious cycle of extremism and social hostility expresses the difficulties facing European 
Muslims, regardless of their enjoying full legal rights as citizens. 
3. Muslim Communal Organisations in Turkey and the UK: Socioeconomic and 
Political Bases 
The relationships between citizens and refugees are shaped significantly by social, economic 
and political circumstances. Thus, they require a clear understanding of realities surrounding 
Muslim communities in the studied countries, Turkey and the UK. Michael Barnett and Janice 
Grass Stein’s argues that the process of secularization and sanctification is socially 
constructed,6 and stress that the different interpretations of religion depend on changes of 
times and historical circumstances, and impact humanitarian relief and the related debate on 
                                                             
6 Secularization of humanitarianism means the process by which elements of everyday and the profane insinuate 
themselves and become integrated into humanitarianism, thus challenging its sacred standing. This is evident in 
the growing role of states and commercial enterprises. Sanctification of humanitarianism means creation of the 
sacred, establishment and protection of a space that is viewed as pure and separate from the profane. This seems 
in the insistence on a space free of politics, and in the calling of a humanitarian ethics (Barnett and Stein: 8). 
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the desirable and the allowable (Barnett and Stein: 10). Although Islamic obligations are based 
on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, their interpretations and implementations vary and should be 
constructed on recognized benefits and harms in the surrounding contexts. 
This section reviews these realities to clarify different institutional and strategic paths taken by 
Muslim communities toward refugees. Specifically, it discusses three main realities: historical 
backgrounds, secularization in Turkey and Britain, and the war on terrorism. 
3.1 Historical Backgrounds: Conflicting Empires 
Historical backgrounds fundamentally contribute to constructing social and political realities. 
Neo-institutionalists, for example, argue that the establishment of societal organisations is 
shaped by its history, which explains why certain paths are taken instead of others. Muslim 
NGOs are not an exception in this regard. Their societies’ historical backgrounds influence 
their perceptions about priorities of religious obligations, cultural sensitivities, and 
consequently possible programs. Hence, the old Turkish and British empires considerably 
influence the realities of Muslim NGOs. This history works on two levels: constructing cultural 
perceptions of others and consequently the possibility of social integration of newly arriving 
refugees.  
3.1.1 History and Cultural Perception of “Others” 
Cultural perceptions are historically constructed to define the self and the others. Although 
these perceptions do not define who acquires citizenship in a country, they determine the 
possibilities of social integration of citizens. Ideally, citizens should be categorized as us, and 
non-citizens as others. Regarding the cases studied here, the historical background of Turkey 
as the heir of the Ottoman Empire, and British colonialism in Arab countries shape Turkish and 
British perceptions of us versus others. 
For many centuries, the Ottoman Empire was the Caliphate recognized by most Muslims in 
the world. As such, it was responsible for protecting the Muslim Ummah (worldwide nation) 
from foreign enemies. Ottoman subjects used to move freely within the Empire, including minor 
Asia, most Arab countries, and the Balkan. However, Western colonialism in Ottoman 
territories, especially the Arab provinces, was a sign of Ottoman decline. Since the collapse of 
the Ottoman empire in 1924, Muslim unity was not materialized in a similar entity.  
The historical role of the Ottoman Empire can hardly be ignored in the Arab countries. With the 
failure of Arab nationalism to fulfil its promise of Arab unity, many Arabs, especially Islamists, 
call for the unity of Muslim Ummah, though not necessarily in the image of the Ottoman Empire. 
During the last decade, the relations between Arab countries and Turkey have witnessed a 
significant improvement, along with the revival of Islamic identities on both sides. Since the 
early 1990s, Tukey has experienced a growing trend to enhancing its Islamic identity in foreign 
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affairs. For example, Necmettin Erbakan, the former Turkish Prime Minister (1996-1997) and 
leader of the Welfare Party, called for establishing the first pan-Muslim economic organisation. 
This trend was strongly encouraged after the Justice and Development Party assumed power 
in 2002. 
Turkish move toward the Muslim Ummah is accompanied with a reorientation of societal 
identity. According to Hüsrev Tabak, “the conceptual map of the Turkish people regarding their 
geography, history and present-day exigencies and outward responsibilities has been 
reconstructed” (Tabak: 197). This is due to three factors: the consciousness of a global Muslim 
community (Ummah) among the religious elite, the space that the ruling Justice and 
Development Party opened for de-securitizing religious activism and promoting international 
humanitarian engagement, the political roles of the Justice and Development Party in global 
Muslim politics based on Turkey’s civilizational responsibilities (Tabak: 199).  
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who ruled as Prime Minister (2003-2014) and the President since 
2014, refers frequently to the Ottoman Empire. He was once known for his efforts to reviving 
a “New Ottomanism” – a sense of belonging among Muslims from different countries, based 
on not only their religious commitments but also historical backgrounds. This led the country 
to receive and welcome refugees from various neighbours, including Iraq, Bulgaria, and Syria. 
Oppressed Muslim minorities from Myanmar or Eastern Turkistan (or Xinjiang) in China can 
now find a safe shelter in Tukey (Yaylaci and Karakuş: 238; Haşimi: 131-133). Thus, the 
Turkish definition of “us” at this moment is relatively more comprehensive and more Islamic. 
This helps the Turkish society to show solidarity with other Muslims easily and deeply. 
Additionally, official humanitarian assistance has become a defining feature of Turkey’s 
international aid activities. It increased significantly to reach one billion dollars in 2012. This 
increase made Turkey the world’s fourth largest donor in humanitarian assistance (Haşimi: 
135-137). In 2012, the fifth annual conference of Turkish ambassadors was titled “humanitarian 
diplomacy”, which is the same name of the mediation program of Turkey’s Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation (IHH). Ahmet Davutoğlu, then the Foreign Minister who later became Prime 
Minster, addressed the conference to elaborate on the three orientations of Turkey’s foreign 
policy: toward citizens of Turkey abroad, toward crisis zones regardless of geographical 
proximity, and toward the structure of global order. This diplomacy allowed Turkey to construct 
new creative forms of diplomatic models and humanitarian vision (Haşimi: 1401-141). In 
addition, Turkey passed a law to offer citizenship for people from Turkish descents, which 
benefited Bulgarian refugees in 1990s. These policies encouraged Islamic NGOs to enhance 
their humanitarian role and move beyond traditional concepts of relief to new activities. This 
expanded the horizons of showing solidarity with refugees. 
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In the other case of the United Kingdom, colonialism was a significant millstone in British as 
well as Muslim histories. Simultaneously with the Ottoman decline, the British occupied several 
Arab countries and continued to rule them until well after World War II. Arabs also blame the 
British for the Balfour Declaration in 1917 in which the British government promised the Jews 
to establish a national homeland for them in Palestine. 
Although the Muslim perception of the UK has gradually improved with educational and 
business opportunities there, Muslims hardly view it as part of “us”. It is still perceived as a 
foreign, Western and Christian-majority country, far from home, and with a hostile colonist past. 
A considerable segment of the British has similarly negative attitudes towards Muslims. 
Accepting them as a racial minority does not remove such historical and cultural barriers. 
According to Kazmi, right-wing parties continue to call foreigners and Muslims to acquire 
“British values” to get assimilated into the British society (Kazmi, 2016). 
In the debate over Brexit, the possibility of Turkey joining the EU was a heated issue, as the 
Turks became symbols of Europe’s foreign “other”. The media campaign for Brexit stressed 
the fear of Turkey joining the EU and thus sending millions of Muslim migrants to the UK. This 
enticed Prime Minister Cameron to talk about Turkey joining the EU in year 3000 (Kazmi, 
2016). 
In short, Muslims who share the same Islamic faith are obligated to show solidarity towards 
each other, and this sharing is practically about defining the religious identities of us and others, 
as well as their historical backgrounds. While Turkey expands the definition of its identity to 
embrace the Islamic world, the UK restricts its identity into a vague Britishness, which implicitly 
alienate Muslims. such national trends in both countries impact the potentials and limits of their 
Muslim citizens to deal with the refugees considering Islamic solidarity. 
3.1.2 History and the Possibility of Social Integration of Refugees 
Since assuming the power, the Justice and Development Party have pursued to improve the 
Turkish relations with other Muslim countries around the world. Initiated by Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu (2014-2016), the civilizational perspective of its foreign policy aimed at a 
zero-problem relationship. This strategy surely faced numerous obstacles due to the 
complexity of regional politics, especially following the Arab Spring, but enhanced the 
civilizational approach within the Turkish society. Thus, it is no wonder that Muslim refugees 
are appreciated, although they have little chances to become citizens unless they descend 
from Turkish origins. 
Refugees in Turkey live in cities or one of the twenty-five camps or more established to shelter 
them. The common culture seems to partially facilitate their smooth integration in terms of the 
social and communal activities. However, Koca argues that “despite the “open door” policy and 
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humanitarian discourse of the government, Syrian refugees have been integrated into a 
security framework of control and containment” (Koca: 55). Practically, apparent welcoming 
policies and practices could not overcome framing and administrate them as a “threat” to the 
domestic market and the employment opportunities for Turkish workers (Koca: 55-75); (Kiris¸ci: 
80-82). Syrian refugees were also portrayed as a “destabilizing” factor due to stereotypes 
linking them to criminality and terrorism (Koca: 55-75). 
More critically, Gümüş and Eroğlu accuse the Justice and Development Party of having an 
ideological-sectarian approach toward Syrian refugees. While acknowledging a partial 
integration of the Syrian refugees into Turkish society, Gümüş and Eroğlu observe several 
cases of exploitation against Sunni Syrians. The situation is even worse for the non-Syrian and 
non-Sunni refugees, like Kurds and Alevis (Gümüş & Eroğlu: 482). Although Syrian refugees 
might enjoy a significant potential for social integration in Turkey due to the shared culture, 
they still experience policies and practices of control, containment or discrimination. 
For the case of the UK, Syrian refugees struggle with two challenges. On one side, there is an 
increasing trend of xenophobia and Islamophobia, coupled with revived right-wing parties. 
Cultural differences, hostile environments, and lack of shared perceptions, all left the refugees 
virtually lost. The UK witnesses a significant presence of right-wing nationalism. It revives the 
so called “Britishness” and pushes to get integrated into the local political discourse. Frequent 
talking about “fundamental British values” easily targets minorities, mainly Muslims, and 
foreigners, even citizens of other European countries (Kazmi, 2016). Simultaneously, solidarity 
movements and some churches frequently protest to welcome refugees and support their right 
to grantee safe shelters in the UK. However, as the Brexit case, while the British public opinion 
is disputed, official policies tend to be more conservative. Influenced by the war on terrorism, 
Islamophobia has gradually been discussed as a daily life issue, especially as far as the 
possibility of social integration is concerned (Kazmi, 2016). 
Zaheer Kazmi argues that by the Brexit voting time, the “Muslim question” was a debatable 
issue. This left British Muslims uncomfortable and feeling targeted (Kazmi, 2016), and makes 
it difficult for British Muslims to show solidarity toward Muslim refugees beyond the limited 
societal expectations. For instance, Muslims can now hardly pressure local or national 
governments to support the Syrian refugees intensively or increase their numbers. 
The other challenge facing Muslim refugees in the UK is British Muslims themselves. According 
to Serena Hussain, most British Muslims came from India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, and left 
these countries in the early 1950s, immediately after they gained independence from the UK, 
which was then in need for workers. Later in the 1970s, these immigrants brought their families, 
and thus their number increased. Since the 1990s, Muslims from the Middle East, which was 
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also mostly under British colonialism, has become increasingly visible in the UK. Some of them 
went there as educated professionals, while others arrived firstly as refugees, but all fled the 
region due to economic or political hardship (Hussain: 24-27). 
Hussain’s study clarifies that Muslims live as one of the minorities in the UK, like Hindus, Sikh, 
etc. Moreover, Muslims are separated into smaller sub-minorities based on national origins or 
religious sects (Hussain: 36-37). Each sub-minority enjoys an influence in certain places and 
has its own mosque. Hussain stresses that Muslims in the UK has the youngest demographic 
profile in the country and the lowest ratio of elders (Hussain: 42). Recent statistics of the British 
Foreign Ministry shows Islam as the second largest religion there, with 2.7 million. Muslims 
constitute 4.7% of the total population, with only 7% Arabs, and 47% born in the UK. 
Some studies trace the tensions and marginalization faced by the Muslim refugees to their 
relations with British Muslims, most of which are Asian or Middle Easterners who arrived 
recently in seeking asylum or refuge. Some observers think that language differences are an 
important factor (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh: 304). Local Muslims might be afraid that 
the new comers will only add to the already mushrooming Islamophobia due to their unknown 
ideologies or economic severe hardship. Therefore, British Muslim donors might prefer, if not 
pushed, to support the needy, including refugees, in their homelands or other hosting 
countries. Although social integration is possible in the UK, due to freedom of speech and 
religion, it is not always guaranteed for reasons pertaining to the British themselves, whether 
Muslims or non-Muslims. 
3.2 Secularization 
Both Turkey and the UK define themselves as secular states. Despite the close relations 
between the English church and Monarchy, the UK separates politics from religion. Turkey 
also adopted secularism since the end of Ottoman Sultanate in 1923. However, the 
secularization process in each of them should be carefully examined to investigate the 
environments surrounding Muslim refugees. 
Charles Taylor distinguishes between two different belief conditions: societies where belief in 
God is dominant, and societies where reasoning unrelated to God is expected in most contexts 
(Harding: 342). Despite decades of secularization, Turkey is easily classified in the first 
category. Most Turkish people are Muslims believing in God, regardless of their rituals 
commitments. This enhances the possibility of religious solidarity acceptance and showing and 
encourages the good reception of refugees, especially those who share the same religion. 
Since the 1980s, religion has had an increasingly public role in Turkey, first in societal 
institutions, then in politics. Gradual presence of Islamic practices in public is in harmony with 
the civilizational perspective of Turkey’s foreign policy, and both are strongly impacted by the 
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Justice and Development Party in power. Although the country still follows a secular path7, the 
significant presence of Islamic vocabulary, rituals, and attitudes is easily found in society8. In 
this milieu, the Islamic organisations, mainly humanitarian and educational, are very active. 
Tabak stresses that the nongovernmental sector in Turkey is characterized by the religious 
orientation of the humanitarian relief organisations, which add to the frequent recall of the 
Ottoman history (Tabak: 195). This Islamic root and presence are interestingly the main 
obstacles that Turkey faces in its struggle to join the European Union. 
Usually, a transit country, Turkey frequently receives an influx of refugees (Kolukirik and Aygül: 
70-72). However, while the Turkish people might encounter some tensions with refugees due 
to economic competitiveness, Kolukirik and Aygül’s’ interviews with some Turkish individuals 
show that the latter still consider the refugees as good Muslims because they are religious 
(Kolukirik and Aygül: 79). Turkish business groups and unions do not call for stopping the 
refugees; they only call upon the government to formalize the informal arrangements related 
to the work of refugees in order for the latter to pay taxes and get protected from exploitation 
(Omar: 17). Though, categorizing refugees based on their religion could jeopardize some of 
them, namely Christian or Alevis. 
One the other hand, the British society belongs to Taylor’s other category, namely, a society 
of reasoning unrelated to God. Khaled Mansour and Heba Raouf Ezzat argue that the 
increasing number and significance of Muslim minorities in the West encourage the developing 
of a new Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) of minorities that focuses on the ultimate goals of Islam 
(instead of literal application of sacred texts), and considers the realities of a secular culture 
and privatized sacred values, rituals and rules (Mansour and Ezzat: 142). That new Fiqh, 
however, should also critically question the assimilation of these conditions in the Islamic belief. 
In the context of Islamic humanitarian organisations, Michael Barnett and Stein demonstrate 
that UK-based Islamic Relief uses secularization as a strategy to overcome moral suspicions 
in society (Barnett and Stein: 24). This mixture of secularization and Islamic obligations shows 
a low level of religious solidarity in a socially appropriate method. 
Stable secularity in the UK can be traced in the last two decades, with a significantly low rate 
of church attendance (Zehavi: 339). Gradually since 1992, the Church of England, along with 
religious minorities, has been involved in activities of social responsibilities, notably the 
provision of social services. This was officially approved by Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997-
2007) (Zehavi: 343-345). This simulated a growing trend in religious tendencies and enhanced 
Christian religiosity in the British society. Unfortunately, this was accompanied by an increasing 
                                                             
7 In his speech at Cairo University in November 2012, President Erdogan advised Egyptians to adopt the Turkish 
secular model. 
8 Turkish secularists bitterly criticize the JDP government of being conservative, with strong religious tones and 
imposing a kind of polity over secular minority (Sirkeci: 138-139).  
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xenophobia. Populist cultures with Christian touches are increasing in several European 
countries. Even before the Syrian crisis hit Europe, the Austrian Vice Chancellor, in 2013 
recommended receiving Syrian refugees, mainly children, women, and Christians. Similar 
statements from European politicians show their perceptions of a “Christian” Europe and the 
possibility that the Syrian refugees would endanger this identity (Hafiz: 19-22). Accordingly, 
Muslim citizens in European countries themselves are at risk due to the increasing number of 
discriminative laws and social behaviour. This risks the “tolerant” secular values of the British 
society. Indeed, despite announced secular polices, the belonging to a different belief is now 
consequential affects considerably actions toward refugees who are mostly Muslim. Ironically, 
while Turkey tends to favour Syrian refugees, as mostly Sunni Muslims, the UK takes step 
toward closeness for the new comers due to the same classification. 
Based on the number of received refugees, while Turkey implements an open-door policy 
toward Syrian refugees, the EU, especially the UK, has a semi open-window approach. Turkey 
opened its doors to civilians as well as militant opposition groups, mainly the Syrian Free Army 
(Oktav and Celikaksoy: 412-413; Ihlamur-Oner: 208). While on the other side, Moghissi 
stresses that the immigration and settlement policies in most European countries are driven 
mainly by security concerns, and focus on how to watch, contain and control Muslims to protect 
society from cultural contamination (Moghissi: 2). Compared to Germany and Sweden, the UK 
and the US tend to receive less refugees, while preferring humanitarian assistance (Ostrand: 
272). 
The contradictions between these two policies and the Turkish long desire to join the EU 
encouraged the singing of the Turkish-European agreement in 2016, which is inconsistent with 
human rights rules, and especially European standards (Mătușescu: 100-101). For Turkey, it 
could be considered as a sort of benefiting from the refugees’ issue, while fulfilling its ambitious 
dream of joining the EU, as the agreement would have immediate advantages for its citizens. 
For the EU, the agreement ensured a limited influx of mostly Muslim refugees9. Thus, the 
agreement is implemented by both sides, though only partially. For example, Kemal Kirişci 
shows the gap between the number of Syrian refugees that the EU is obliged by the agreement 
to relocate in Europe and the real number of relocated Syrian refugees (Kirisci: 82-83). This 
shows the agreement’s limited potential for success, and the EU efforts to limit the number of 
relocated Syrian refugees in Europe, perhaps because their potential integration is doubtful.  
                                                             
9 For details on the difficulties of implementing the Turkish-European agreement regarding Syrian refugees, see: 
Shawqi, Ahmed. (2016): Syrian Refugees: Political and Humanitarian Dimensions. Issues and Visions. 1(2). pp. 20-
29 (In Arabic). 
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3.3 War on Terror 
Due to domestic political concerns and pressure from the US, some Arab governments, 
especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, treated as terrorists its citizens who participated in the 
Afghani or Bosnian wars during the 1980s and 1990s. The 9/11 events were a turning point in 
this regard, as the so-called war on terror turned global. Lacking an agreed-upon definition of 
terrorism, the US waged a war that targeted mainly Muslim countries and organisations. It 
treated the activities of these organisations and suspicious and imposed restrictions on the 
movement of their staff and money. Military campaigns targeted Afghanistan and Iraq, with 
little transparency or accountability. Then, al-Qaida attacked Madrid in 2004 and London in 
2005, and a decade later, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levitant (ISIL) attacked France, 
Belgium, and the UK. 
Consequently, Europeans and Americans developed negative attitudes toward Muslims, 
especially Middle Easterners. While American President Donald Trump frequently linked 
terrorism to Islam, Europe witnessed mushrooming trends of Islamophobia, with an increasing 
number of hate crimes. The situation was further complicated by the influx of refugees, mostly 
Syrian, in the last few years. 
From an early stage of this war on terror, Islamic humanitarian organisations were linked to 
terrorism. They suffered from tough restrictions apparently aiming at preventing any potential 
funding of terrorist activities, although earlier in the 1980s, during the Afghani war, militants, 
preachers, and humanitarian workers had close relations blessed by regional and global 
powers. In the first stage of the war on terror, humanitarian works were obviously 
acknowledged, while preaching was denounced and militancy criminalized. Later, however, 
most activities of Islamic humanitarian organisations were criticized. 
Nevertheless, other cases of close relationships between humanitarian relief and militant 
activities are not equally criticized. Pérouse de Montclos argues that humanitarian aid is 
frequently used as a tool to support militant activities or win the hearts and minds of people, 
especially under colonialism (Pérouse de Montclos: 235). Examples include the activities of 
Catholic priests in Ireland before 1920, and Christian clergy during Nigeria’s civil war (1967-
1970). These movements considered “charity as implying that the giver has control over the 
recipient”, and that “solidarity means showing respect for the partners’ integrity and their right 
to set their own conditions” (Pérouse de Montclos: 238; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 155). 
These cases express a perception of solidarity that is more radical and fundamental in terms 
of reconstructing the disadvantaged realities, in spite of only providing temporary humanitarian 
relief. 
 20 
Despite continuous investigations of Islamic organisations, rare evidence was provided to 
support any claims of their relations with militants, while many of them were forced to stop their 
activities due to financial or political restrictions. Supporting Muslim refugees raises these 
claims again. Lucy Salek complains that Muslims organisations face a dilemma between the 
fear of accusations of links with militant groups and violations of counterterrorism legislations 
on one hand, and the revealing of their religious identity and taking the advantage of the 
religiously-based trust of local and international Muslim communities on the other hand (Salek 
(2015): 362). 
Recent attacks in the UK, though done by British, enhanced Islamophobia in the society, and 
the stereotype of Middle Eastern terrorist Muslims - an image that can easily apply to Syrian 
refugees. Thus, while British Muslims are urged to show solidarity with their oppressed Muslim 
brothers and sisters, they should overcome negative stereotyping as terrorists or connected to 
them. Besides, Islamic organisations must abide by a growing number of restrictive regulations 
addressing terrorism but targeting Muslims specifically. 
Since the 1990s, UK-based Islamic Relief, a leading humanitarian organisation mostly working 
in Muslim countries and inspired by Islamic values, had to exert great efforts to disprove 
terrorist accusations. One of its tactics was to align its discourse with the international 
humanitarian standards and terms; another was to strictly eliminate any elements of 
proselytization, let alone militancy, from its humanitarian relief activities. These tactics seem 
so far successful. They are based on showing solidarity in an appropriate form as a Western-
based organisation with Islamic values. 
Turkey is different because its war on terror targets mainly the Kurdish rebels of the PKK, 
although it was hit several times by ISIL. The common perception of terrorism there is 
unconnected to Islam or Muslims because all involved parties are Muslim. The Turkish 
government and the public opinion in general deal with ISIL as one party in the Syrian war that 
is against Turkey. Islam is hardly referred to in such political and militant disputes. ISIL is not 
considered in Turkey as a true Islamic state; instead, its ideology and deeds are denounced 
as corrupted for political goals. It is ironic, however, that the Turkish government was accused 
of supporting Islamic militants in Syria other than ISIL. 
Therefore, Turkish Islamic humanitarian organisations enjoy considerable support in relieving 
the huge number of refugees fleeing daily from Syria into Turkey. Accusations of Islamic 
terrorism are easily falsified, or at least ignored, in such an encouraging environment of 
showing Islamic solidarity. Turkish humanitarian organisations can apparently negotiate more 
space for dealing with refugees without the fear or sensitivity of their counterparts in Britain. 
Additionally, the Turkish government is intensively involved in the Syrian war, taking militant 
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and humanitarian actions. Contrarily, the British government has been hesitant to go beyond 
financial support in this crisis; for instance, to receive more refugees, not to mention involved 
in a humanitarian intervention against the oppressive Syrian regime10. Turkey received three 
million refugees compared to the UK which negotiated the admission of 20,000 refugees only 
(BBC News, 2016).  
4. Turkish and British Islamic Organisations: Strategies and Outcomes 
Official responses notwithstanding, humanitarian organisations are usually the most 
respondents to refugee issues. Based on the Islamic solidarity concept, Islamic humanitarian 
organisations are motivated largely to show solidarity with refugees. This section discusses 
the strategies that major Turkish and British Islamic humanitarian organisations follow in their 
dealing with refugee issues, especially Syrian refugees. It also discusses the outcomes of 
these strategies as implemented in certain programs. I assess these strategies and outcomes 
considering the Islamic solidarity concept.  
4.1 Refugees and Islamic Humanitarian Organisations 
Civil society organisations usually deal with refugee issues as a part of their societal missions. 
Hein and Niazi note that most initiatives to welcome Syrian refugees in the UK, US and Iceland 
came mainly from civil society organisations, not governments (Hein and Niazi: 727). The 
mission of humanitarian relief organisations is comprehensive, covering the societal needs of 
the refugees in the receiving countries. I focus here on the Islamic humanitarian relief 
organisations to test my argument that Muslims’ commitment to showing solidarity with each 
other might be constructed upon different interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Consequently, this implies various implementations, considering the social and political 
contexts. Thus, I investigate humanitarian relief strategies, programs, and outcomes in the light 
of Islamic solidarity in Turkey and the UK. 
UNHCR statistics of April 2017 shows that Turkey hosts about 3 million Syrians, which makes 
it the world’s first host of refugees. Lebanon comes second with one million refugees. The 
funds needed to support the refugees in Turkey is estimated at $890 million, with a current gap 
of $767 million (Syria Regional Refugee Response, April 2017). As Europe’s largest recipient 
of Syrian refugees, Germany has received only 600 thousand, making the total number of 
refugees of all nationalities to one million (Beauchamp, 2017). 
Turkey does not grant a refugee status to asylum-seekers who come from outside Europe, as 
its recorded reservation on the Geneva Refugee Convention shows. Instead, In October 2011, 
the Turkish government announced an open-door policy toward Syrian refugees, offering them 
                                                             
10 The fighting British troops in Syria is a part of the anti - Islamic State of Iraq and Levitant (ISIL) forces. 
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a “temporary protection regime” as a legal framework. This regime grants few legal rights to 
refugees (Yaylaci and Karakuş: 239). 
Relevantly, the Turkish government is criticized for lacking a consistent stance toward Syrian 
refugees. Its policies and practices are mostly shaped by domestic and foreign policy concerns. 
While dominated by normative incentives in receiving more than three million refugees, the 
governmental policies toward them are still hesitant. The government addresses refugees in 
its social, security and economic policies. Parallel, it also utilizes their presence in its foreign 
policy; in enhancing its international role and image as well improving its relationship with the 
EU (Memisoglu & Ilgit: 332). This fragile balance might offer Syrian refugees safe shelters and 
several economic and social advantages but cannot grantee them a permanent settlement. 
The UN and European governments have not set specific arrangements to adjust the 
international status of a refugee to allow him or her to seek asylum in a third country. Thus, the 
Turkish authorities do not grant international organisations access to the camps of Syrian 
refugees (Ihlamur-Oner: 194). Consequently, the Turkish government has had to depend 
intensively on local civil society organisations, in addition to the Turkish Red Crescent. Paker 
argues that it is common for humanitarian organisations to work closely with their governments, 
both directly like the Red Cross/Crescent and indirectly like the civil society organisations that 
share the same mission with the government (Paker: 647-660). 
Turkish Islamic humanitarian organisations, which flourished after the Balkan war in the 1990s, 
specially the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH),11 have played significant roles in 
supporting Syrian refugees. But the increasing number of Syrian refugees put pressures on 
the government to allow Syrians to establish their own humanitarian relief organisations in 
Turkey and accommodate the refugees in the Turkish educational system (Omar: 22). 
The Balkan war was also a turning point for British Islamic organisations. Benthall and Bellion-
Jourdan establish that this war triggered initiatives of competitive campaigns by Muslim 
minorities in the West. It was a head step in developing Islamic charities, notably UK-based 
Islamic Relief, which is recognized by British authorities, especially as it does not engage in 
any sort of militancy or proselytization (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 133-134). 
For a long time, British Muslims preferred to send money back home because they find poverty 
in the UK, which provides citizens with social services, incomparable to poverty in their 
countries of origin (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 11). Hence, their donation to Islamic charities 
for the sake of specific cases was indeed a major change. Many of them, however, still prefer 
                                                             
11 The Head of the IHH frequently acknowledges his fruitful relationship with Necmettin Erbakan, the former 
Turkish Prime Minister (1996-1997), who was pressured by the Army to step down for violating the constitutional 
separation between religion and politics. 
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to support Muslim refugees abroad, not locally, because refugees in the UK receive financial 
support from the government. 
Unlike Turkey, the rise of Islamic humanitarian relief organisations initiated debates in the UK. 
Per Salek, some opponents argue that the religious identity of these organisations jeopardizes 
their neutrality in humanitarian actions, and humanitarianism might well compete with, if not 
contradict religious obligations. Others suggest that religions are conservative, produce 
partisan alliances and create conflicts (Salek, 2015: 346). On the other hand, Salek finds 
harmony between Islamic principles and humanitarian relief (Salek, 2015: 352-357). Facing 
this wind, Islamic organisations had to downplay their religious identity and accept secular 
narratives, so they can receive fund from major donors (Salek (2015): 348). 
Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference between the two concepts of humanitarian relief and 
Islamic solidarity: while the latter assumes the multiplicity of levels of solidarity, the former is 
concerned with and strictly limited to only one level. Although flexible mechanisms of Islamic 
Jurisprudence allow various interpretations and implementations of showing the solidarity, it is 
still acknowledged maximizing supportive efforts and denouncing restricting them to certain 
areas. 
This, in fact, is the difference between the Turkish IHH and the UK-based Islamic Relief. While 
the latter reacts to misperceptions by toning down its religious base and calling itself an Islamic-
Inspired foundation, the former highlights its religious identity and promotes its rise in Turkey. 
The Islamic Relief struggles to balance between the expectations of its Muslim donors who like 
to show solidarity with other Muslims on the one hand, and the undermining of its religious 
identity to adhere only to humanitarian principles (Salek (2015): 359). This explains the 
strategic use of Islamic slogans by Islamic Relief while following the humanitarian agendas. 
This integrates secular humanitarian principles with Islamic solidarity as an Islamic Relief 
strategy to maximize its humanitarian benefits. 
In the next subsection, I will study Islamic Relief and IHH strategies for supporting refugees, 
based on their programs implementation, which will be examined by three criteria: the selection 
of services provided, the integration of religious elements in service delivery, and the voluntary 
versus mandatory participation in specific religious activities (Bielefeld and Cleveland: 446-
447). Program implementation, along with organisational control, expression of religion, is 
major assessment categories and elements of the definition of a Faith Based Organisation. 
4.2 Islamic Relief and The Foundation for Humanitarian Relief (IHH) 
Islamic Relief was established by Egyptian immigrants in Birmingham in 1984, who were 
moved by the famine in the African Horn. Its activities combine humanitarian relief and 
developmental actions. It enjoys international recognition and trust due to its efficiency 
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professionalism, moderate Islamic orientation, and alignment with the international 
developmental agenda. Its guiding Islamic humanitarian values are also in step with the 
international developmental discourse (Petersen: 145-146; Abuarqub: 7). 
The IHH was started in 1992 by a handful volunteers who participated in humanitarian works 
during the Bosnian war. Their work led to its official establishment in 1995 as the Foundation 
for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief by Fehmi Bülent Yıldırım and 
Mahmut Savaş. It seeks to improve the basic human rights of all needy and oppressed people, 
prevent violations of their rights and freedom, observe unchanging values in a changing world, 
and let the good will rule everywhere. The IHH acts in the fields of humanitarian relief and 
diplomacy, human rights, emergency aid, voluntary works, and raising awareness 
(https://www.ihh.org.tr/en). 
Hüsrev Tabak shows that the IHH delivers humanitarian aid to about 140 countries around the 
world, acts as a mediator in disputes and intra-state conflicts, namely in Pakistan, Syria, the 
Philippines, and as a facilitating platform for discussions to settle the Kurdish grievances 
(Tabak: 193-194). The organisation calls this activity a humanitarian diplomacy. Since its 
inception in 1992 until early 2015, the IHH contributed to releasing more than 2,230 persons 
of nine nationalities (Humanitarian Relief Foundation, 2015: 18). 
4.2.1 Service Selection 
The designed programs and provided services reflect the humanitarian approach and available 
choices for an organisation. The humanitarian approaches of Islamic Relief and the IHH are 
shaped considerably by the levels of secularization and scarification in their societies, more 
than expanding the concept of Islamic solidarity to its limits. Both organisations benefit from 
flexible Islamic Jurisprudence to determine the variety of offered programs, their inspiring 
values, targeted beneficiaries such as refugees, in serving locations, as discussed below. 
4.2.1.1 Controlling Values 
Influenced by their societies, both Islamic Relief and the IHH maintain two levels of controlling 
values and work ethics: one proclaimed and the other implicit. While Islamic Relief sees itself 
as an Islamic-inspired humanitarian organisation, the IHH claims to be a human rights defender 
and a humanitarian relief organisation. It makes no reference to Islamic values because of the 
strictly secular laws in Turkey. Both organisations use the Islamic rituals of Zakat (annual 
obligatory charity) and Sadaqat (optional charity) to fundraise for their activities and provide 
services to the needy regardless of their religion, race, gender, sect, or language. 
Implicit values of Islamic Relief include professionality and transparency. Barnett and Stein 
argue that secularization is about rationalization, bureaucratization, and professionalization of 
humanitarian relief. This might threaten the religious obligations when undermined by 
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calculations of personal/institutional costs and benefits instead of being based on piety (Barnett 
and Stein: 24). They give Islamic Relief as an example of strategic secularization to reassure 
continuity, given the suspicions in its environment (Barnett and Stein: 24)12. Lucy Salek 
contends that Islamic Relief follows Maqasid al-Shari’ah (the ultimate goals of Islamic 
jurisprudence) to calculate the benefits and harms (Salek, 2015: 364-368). 
This professionality prevented Islamic Relief from taking a political stand in the Syrian 
revolution, except for using the general description of “Arab Spring” to refer to the various 
political changes in the Arab states. The organisation described the Syrian case in its annual 
reports as a conflict, then as a crisis (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2012). These vague 
descriptions were used even before later claims about Islamic militancy there. 
Islamic Relief published “Working in Conflict: A Faith Based Toolkit for Islamic Relief” to clarify 
issues related to its works in sensitive places and issues. According to this publication, Islamic 
Relief stands with the international humanitarian principals of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, 
and independence (Salek, 2014: 26). This is consistent with secular humanitarian relief and 
clearly shows a limited understanding of Islamic solidarity. Inspired by Maqasid al-Shari’ah (the 
ultimate goals of Islamic Jurisprudence), Islamic Relief calls for transforming any conflict into 
a dialogue or peaceful interaction (Salek, 2014: 38). The report highlights the organisation’s 
high sensitivity to getting involved in the politicization of any conflict (Salek, 2014: 159-162). 
No justification was mentioned; only that it limits its activities strictly to humanitarian relief as 
the appropriate showing solidarity, based on its readings of Islamic goals. 
The IHH seems to apply a proactive approach more than using a professionality rhetoric. 
Despite lacking clear Islamic logos, it exemplifies Islamic values in siding with and magnifying 
the voice of the oppressed and thus helping the creation of a more just world. It is about 
changing, more than aligning with, the current humanitarian system. Thus, its annual reports 
on its activities in Syria (2012-2014) not only review the background of the crisis but also side 
with the revolution (Humanitarian Relief Foundation, 2014). This shows the organisation’s 
political stand. 
4.2.1.2 Targeted Beneficiaries in Served Locations 
The programmes of Islamic Relief and the IHH mainly target Syrian refugees now a majority 
of all refugees. As an Islamic-inspired organisation addressing the needs of refugees who are 
mostly Muslim, Islamic Relief issued a report in 2014 explaining the rights of forced refugees 
in Islam, which are not only rooted in Islamic values but also addressing modern challenges 
(Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014: The Rights of Forced migrants in Islam: 4). The report is a 
                                                             
12 An example of the strategic use of the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey is its newspapers coverage which tends 
to reproduce the competing ideological and political stands more than emphasizing the humanitarian aspect 
(Yaylaci and Karakuş: 248). 
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theoretical discussion of the rights of refugees and asylum-seeks and focuses on the 
obligations of Muslim countries and their need of a framework for receiving refugees and 
regulating their rights and duties. However, it ignores the case of receiving refugees in non-
Muslim countries, despite its relevance to the organisation’s context. 
Both Islamic Relief and the IHH have been pushed by certain political and societal conditions 
to show solidarity in specific locations: while Islamic Relief works dominantly away from home, 
the IHH runs its programs at home or close to it. In the UK, although the government allocated 
about 2.5 billion pounds for the refugees between 2012 and 2016, only 20 thousand refugees 
are permitted to stay in the country as such for five years before they can apply to settle down 
there (BBC News, 2016). Most funds, however, are assigned to support registering Syrian 
refugees and providing them with basic humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter and 
relief packages in other hosting countries, namely, Lebanon (337 million), Turkey (118 million), 
beside Iraq, Egypt and Jordon (Department for International Development and UK Aid, 2017). 
Islamic Relief designed programmes in Lebanon, Jordon, Iraq, and Syrian territories. Working 
at home seemed less urgent, considering the limited number of refugees there and the financial 
support they receive from other local organisations. The organisation received funds from the 
British authorities and other European donors to support refugees in camps overseas, perhaps 
to avoid controversies in relation to the influx of refugees into Europe. In addition, the 
organisation supports the refugees to meet their urgent needs in Greece, Italy, Macedonia, 
and Germany. 
From another perspective, Islamic Relief helps the refugees to stay in their country, because 
otherwise, by facilitating their fleeing, they would risk losing the ability to eventually return 
home. Similarly, during the Bosnian war, Muslim organisations had the priority of keeping 
Muslim Bosnians at home, against UN recommendations, because evacuating them would 
contribute to the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 140). 
However, for Bosnian Muslims who fled to European countries, both Islamic Relief and the 
Muslim Aid, the second largest organisation of its kind in the UK, supported the establishment 
of an Islamic centre to facilitate their settlement there (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan: 141). 
To the contrary, the IHH works mainly in Turkey but also in Syrian regions. As the Turkish 
government prevents the international humanitarian organisations from accessing the refugee 
camps, the IHH struggles to meet the mushrooming needs in those camps. It runs four offices 
in the Turkish governorates close to Syria and four on the Turkish-Syrian borders that cover 
operations inside Syria. Interestingly, like the IHH, Islamic Relief works inside the Syrian 
territories controlled by the opposition groups, despite its declared neutrality. 
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Both organisations have to struggle to fulfil their humanitarian mission. Domestically, the IHH 
works under the pressure of an increasing number of fled refugees, alongside with a limited 
coordination between national and international humanitarian organisations and inadequate 
cooperation with the international organisations and the Turkish state (Memisoglu & Ilgit: 333). 
Intensive humanitarian efforts have not been enough to convince thousands of Syrian refugees 
risking their lives to reach a European country (Koca: 55-75). 
Internationally, Islamic Relief seeks to compensate refugees British restricted policies that 
deter them from travelling to a safe country (Turner: 2015). Since 2012, the UK government 
has committed large amounts of humanitarian relief to Syrian refugees; being the second 
largest donor to the Syrian refugee crisis. However, it was hesitant to offer them resettlement. 
In 2015, the UK established the Syrian “Vulnerable Person Resettlement Scheme”, which was 
separate from the existing UNHCR resettlement program, but was described as consistent with 
the latter (Blinder: 8-9). Ostrand considers this program as lacking the requirements of the 
1951 Geneva Convention (Ostrand: 268). 
British humanitarian organisations urged the Prime Minister to do more; to resettle at least 5% 
of the total Syrian refugee population by the end of 2015 (Smith & Gower & Bardens: 1). The 
assumed number was 10.000 persons; the offered number currently reaches 20.000 to be 
settled by 2020. They were firstly given “humanitarian protection” status, with permission to 
work and access public fund. In early 2017, it was announced that these refugees will be 
offered refugee status (McGuinness: 3). Despite the seemingly high number, the UK is still 
behind compared to other European countries in the resettlement of Syrian refugees (May: 
2017); (Ostrand: 272). The UK’s share of Europe’s asylum declined from 11% in 2008 to 3% 
in both 2015 and 2016 (Blinder 9). 
4.2.1.3 Variety of Programs 
Islamic Relief and the IHH run various programs in a manner reflecting their controlling values, 
political and social realities, and their priorities and interpretations of solidarity. 
In its strategic plan for 2011-2015, Islamic Relief aimed at providing an Islamic perspective on 
humanitarian and social justice issues, which had not been well articulated or understood, both 
globally and among the concerned Muslim communities (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2011: 
Global Strategy 2011-2015: 17). 
Emphasizing religious values, Islamic Relief’s annual report in 2011 elaborated on its response 
to the Arab Spring (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2011: Annual Report and Financial Statements: 
12-13), describing the “disenfranchised communities mobilizing to create political change,” as 
well as its role as providing “vital humanitarian assistance to people caught up in conflict and 
suffering as unemployment and inflation soared across the region”. It focused on raising global 
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awareness of the on-going humanitarian needs (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2011: Annual 
Report and Financial Statements: 25). However, it neither took a clear political position nor 
suggested a support program rather than humanitarian relief. 
Relevantly, Islamic Relief explained its response to the refugee crisis in Europe, estimating the 
number of refugees there in 2012 at 293,606. It launched a complimentary response 
programme called Mediterranean Refugee Crisis (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014: Islamic 
Relief: Syria Emergency Response 2012-2014: 2). Part of it was to provide the refugees with 
food packs, hygiene kits and cultural mediation in Greece, Italy, Macedonia, and Germany 
(Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2016: Syria Five Years Crisis: 1). Additional programmes included 
humanitarian aid to non-Syrians, like internally displaced Iraqis and Palestinian refugees in 
Syria and other hosting countries, mainly Lebanon, Jordon and, to a less extent, Turkey. It 
delivered more than $195 million worth of aid inside Syrian and other refugees-hosting 
countries and provided supplies to besieged regions in Syria and displaced people along 
Turkish borders. These supplies included medical assistance, food parcels and World Food 
Program vouchers, shelter and cash for rent, water and sanitation, as well as such essential 
items as heaters, clothing, cash to help the refugees meet their urgent basic needs, education 
support, psychological assistance, in addition to vital aid and food supplies for Palestinians 
trapped in the Yarmouk camp. 
Islamic Relief continued its humanitarian efforts in 2013 to support those suffering in “the worst 
humanitarian crisis of our time”. It carried out programs in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan (Islamic 
Relief Worldwide, 2013: 10). Domestically, it presented a report to the UK government with 
key suggestions to reduce the suffering of Syrians, but with no recommendations of specific 
actions. Besides, it issued a petition calling for international action to secure a better access 
to the country and initiated a campaign to protect Syrian children. The report also called for 
humanitarian corridors inside Syria. (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2013: 14; Islamic Relief 
Worldwide, 2015). 
Islamic Relief was more active domestically in 2014, as it called on the British government to 
join the global programme for resettling the most vulnerable refugees (Islamic Relief 
Worldwide, 2014: Annual Report and Financial Statements: 26), with no discussion of details 
or outcomes. In the same year, while the organisation celebrated its 30th anniversary, it 
acknowledged the 20th anniversary since it became the first ever Muslim NGO to receive 
funding from the British government (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014: Annual Report and 
Financial Statements: 31). 
Islamic Relief’s strategic plan 2017-2021 pessimistically described the increase of conflict and 
forced migration in the world but admitted its ability to access Muslim communities in war 
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zones. The report notes that the “increasing scale of forced migration has also affected many 
developed countries, with a growing need for a humanitarian response to inward refugee flows” 
(Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2017: 3). This hints at its local humanitarian work, especially in the 
light of the rising Islamophobia. 
The organisation suggests implicitly that the rapid political changes in the Middle East and 
North Africa resulted in a misunderstanding of how this region and the wider Muslim world will 
embrace political reform. This, in turn, produces a fear of immigrants and politicizes Islam, and 
confuses Islam with oppressive culture, violent extremism and terrorism; hence, the 
widespread fear of and aggression against Muslims. The solution, the report proposes, is to 
build alliances of mutual trust and understanding and to encourage a greater representation of 
Islamic perspectives to tackle ignorance (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2017: 3). 
On the other hand, the IHH is involved in intensive Islamic programmes without describing 
them as such. It runs various activities including humanitarian relief and social aid such as 
digging wells, health care services and establishing orphanages, schools, cultural centres, and 
mosques. These activities may be considered a sort of proselytization, or at least an attempt 
to preserve the Islamic identity for Muslim minorities, especially the oppressed and neglected, 
such as in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Myanmar. The IHH classifies mosques as educational 
and cultural centres and the opposite; thus, reports that cultural centres function as mosques 
where mosques are not allowed. Its annual report in 2015 elaborates on its efforts to overcome 
Christian missionaries in Muslim communities (Humanitarian Relief Foundation, 2015: 10); 
thus, it reveals the clear mission of the IHH, compared to the ambiguous explanation of 
solidarity in the Islamic Relief literature. 
Besides running refugee camps, the IHH provides food packages, distributes donated meat in 
the Muslim pilgrimage season, supports orphans, establishes orphanages, opens schools, 
offers phycological support for displaced families, and delivers logistic support for hundreds of 
schools in Turkey and Syria. One of its main programs is managing bakeries and delivering 
more than 266 thousand loafs of bread in 2015. 
A recent significant IHH contribution to Syrian refugees, in cooperation with a Qatari 
organisation, was the establishment of a city for orphans in Hatay’s Reyhanh province. The 
city opened on 18th May 2017 as the best refugee orphanage in the world (Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation, 2016: RAF & IHH Children Living Center). It aims to protect “Syrian child victims 
of war, against missionary organisations, crime syndicates and mafia rings, giving them a safe 
environment to live”, and pass down “solidarity and good feelings of Syrian-Turkish 
brotherhood to the next generation by caring for and raising Syrian child victims of war, on the 
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basis of mercy and kindness” (Humanitarian Relief Foundation, 2016: RAF & IHH Children 
Living Center: 8)13. 
Additionally, the work of the IHH involves different levels of solidarity, coping with Turkey’s role 
in the Syrian crisis. Several reports mention that not only Syrian refugee camps but also spots 
on the Turkish borders host clinics and recovery places for wounded militants of the Free 
Syrian Army since 2012 (Krajeski: 62-63). Later, the Turkish government intervened militarily 
in Northern Syria, in cooperation with the FSA. It should be noticed, however, that, due to the 
global war on terror, the IHH admits no direct relations with Islamic militants, although it 
promotes humanitarian diplomacy, plays the role of mediator in international conflicts, and 
exerts efforts to free hostages through controversial negotiations. Despite similarities in 
humanitarian programs, the IHH goes further than Islamic Relief in showing Islamic solidarity 
to refugees, benefiting from a welcoming local government and a supportive environment. 
Islamic Relief demonstrates significant success in humanitarian relief, with limited possibility 
of further steps of showing solidarity, as taking political stances or playing a proactive religious 
role. 
4.2.2 Integrating Religious Elements in Service Delivery 
In a study of Islamic relief, Marie Juul Peterson notes the cooperation between Muslim NGOs 
and the British Department of International Development to prevent radicalization, as a soft 
counter-terrorism approach (Petersen: 136). Islamic Relief was an important partner that grew 
steadily in terms of national as well as international activities. It now receives funds from 
international donors and has partnerships with various recognized developmental and 
humanitarian organisations (Petersen: 138). 
One feature of this strategy is minimizing religious elements in the organisation’s work and 
administrative structure. Besides offering services to Muslims and non-Muslims as well, its 
hiring and aid policies are not based on the religious commitments of the potential employees 
or beneficiaries (Kirmani and Khan: 3). It also stresses frequently that its activities are not 
oriented towards proselytization, not to mention militancy. Rather, it usually criticizes similar 
organisations in the Middle East because they engage in proselytization or militant activities. 
On the other hand, it praises the neutrality, universality, and tolerance of Western NGOs 
(Petersen: 148). Strictly humanitarian, the organisation complains of confusing its 
humanitarian role with activities of other religious bodies which might have political goals 
(Kirmani and Khan: 9). Despite its seasonal religious activities in Ramadan and Eid Al-Adha 
which partially fulfil the expectations of its Muslim donors, Islamic Relief, according to Peterson, 
practices a secular Islam that can easily be integrated with the developmental and 
                                                             
13 For details on the IHH activities in Syria in 2014-2016, see: Humanitarian Relief Foundation, 2014: Annual Report 
on The IHH Work in Syria; and Humanitarian Relief Foundation, 2016: RAF & IHH Children Living Center: 12-20. 
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humanitarian aid philosophy, as it does not question its premises fundamentally (Petersen: 
147). 
The organisation’s programs are not so concerned with refugees in the UK. While Kirmani and 
Khan stress the importance of faith in rehabilitating the refugees, they find little efforts of Islamic 
Relief to support them in both religious and humanitarian terms (Kirmani and Khan: 5). 
However, they find it, as a Muslim organisation, capable of addressing such sensitive issues 
for the refugees as women’s rights and HIV protection. In cases like Bosnia, it encouraged and 
helped the refugees to return home (Kirmani and Khan: 8). 
Salek notes the contradiction between Islamic Relief’s initial base, namely the Islamic duty of 
giving, and the unclarity in its approach to the Islamic faith. Based on analysing the 
organisation’s literature, she finds problematic its confusion of secular and religious concepts 
and terms of humanitarian relief. To solve this problem, Islamic Relief received funds from the 
UK Department of International Development in 2010 to research this topic and develop a 
“faith-literate” approach to humanitarian relief (Salek, 2015: 348). For Islamic Relief, the 
religious elements play a considerable role in fundraising and labelling it an Islamic 
humanitarian relief organisation but are hardly significant in its organisational structure and 
designed programs. 
Contrarily, the IHH pays more attention to religious elements in its programs. Despite the low 
profile of its Islamic perspective, it does not only fundraise based on Islamic rituals but also 
highlights repeatedly its goals of preserving Muslims from missionaries, building mosques and 
cultural centres, and distributing gifts in Islamic festivals. Furthermore, based on an 
understanding of the civilizational roles and religious obligations, the organisation considers 
the materialistic approach to humanitarian relief not enough to preserve human dignity or trace 
the factors that endanger it. Its humanitarian diplomacy exceeds normal forms of humanitarian 
relief to include the protection of life and rights of people in zones of conflict, the prevention of 
deporting asylum seeks, advocating the release of imprisoned or kidnapped civilians in war 
zones, and mediation as a praiseworthy duty recommended in the Qur’an. This is all proved in 
many examples in Syria and Pakistan (Tabak:200-206). 
4.2.3 Participation in Specific Religious Activities 
None of the two studied organisations requires their beneficiaries to participate in specific 
religious activities. Overwhelmingly sensitive to accusations of proselytization, Islamic Relief 
does not build mosques or get involved in relevant activities. It claims to embody the Islamic 
values through contributing to development and capacity building programs. Its seasonal 
religious programs are available for Muslims as well and non-Muslims and its fundraising 
based on religious rituals is completely voluntarily. On the other hand, the IHH shows an 
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interest in activities that preserve the Islamic identity of refugees, such as its orphanage city 
which aims at protecting orphans from missionaries. However, participation in religious 
activities is evidently not mandatory. 
5. Conclusion 
Muslims are obliged by their religion to show solidarity toward each other, although Islam does 
not mandate one specific method to do that. This duty, however, must be fulfilled, individually 
or collectively, based on calculations of benefits and harms. Some Muslim scholars distinguish 
between three, practically interrelated levels of solidarity: fighting for the sake of Allah, calling 
for Islam, and humanitarian relief. But due to the regional and international war on terror, which 
is still an undefined concept, only humanitarian relief is now permitted, while proselytization is 
condemned and fighting criminalized. Inspired by Prophet Muhammed’s migration from Mecca 
to Madinah, Muslims are obligated to support refugees who are forced to flee their countries 
out of fear, due to persecution based on their race, religion, sect or political opinions. European 
Muslims, however, face the dilemma of meeting this religious obligation while abiding by the 
laws of their countries and their legal responsibilities. Thus, they now consider new forms of 
Islamic solidarity adaptable to their citizenships. They are helped by Islamic jurisprudence 
which allows for a space for creative understandings and applications. 
New interpretations and implementations of Islamic solidarity differ based on how benefits and 
harms in the surrounding contexts are defined. As the heir of the Ottoman Empire that now 
witnesses Islamic revival, Turkey increasingly defines “us” more in terms of Islamic belonging. 
Whereas British society is currently disputed between an increasing islamophobia and 
sympathetic social groups, which restrict its identity into a vague Britishness that might alienate 
Muslims. Thus, this limits the potentials of European Muslims to rush to support Muslim 
refugees based on Islamic obligations. 
Surrounding realities impact the strategies and outcomes of Islamic humanitarian relief 
organisations in Turkey and the UK. On the one hand, the friendly environment encourages 
the Turkish IHH to adopt a multileveled concept of Islamic solidarity, based on religious ties. 
On the other hand, Islamic Relief must deal with a suspicious, perhaps hostile, society, and 
thus employs only the concept of humanitarian relief as the appropriate method of solidarity. 
These two different approaches are reflected in the offered programs, inspiring values, and 
targeted beneficiaries in the served locations of the two organisations. Their outcomes are 
expected in light of these limits and opportunities. 
Based on the studied cases, I conclude that Islamic humanitarian organisations, although 
committed to showing solidarity with refugees, develop various programs and strategies. They 
benefit from flexible dynamics of Islamic jurisprudence to construct several interpretations and 
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implementations of this solidarity. Islamic organisations have to negotiate spaces of 
scarification and secularization in their societies. Therefore, in the Turkish case, these 
implementations now expand considerably, while in the UK, the fact that Islam is a minority 
religion hinders a similar trajectory. 
The ability of governments to accept more refugees will be limited by the increasing 
islamophobia that also might harden the possibility of social integration of the refugees. 
European Muslims will struggle to reconcile their religious obligations and citizens’ duties, and 
a new Islamic interpretation of humanitarian relief will continue to serve as the safest path out 
of this paradox. In Turkish society, Islamic foundations survived decades of secularization, but 
its current revival might be at risk due to regional and international politics.  
Relations among Muslims in these societies will determine the extent of Islamic solidarity 
toward the refugees, and further research on these relations are therefore needed. 
Researching the refugees’ perceptions of local Muslims in the hosting countries will also help 
us understand their reactions to Islamic solidarity showed by those citizens.  
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